Day: April, 11th 2017 |
Room: Pompeian II |
Time: 09:50 – 10:50 |
Organizers: Swarup Bhunia, Mark Tehranipoor (University of Florida) |
Moderator: Swarup Bhunia (University of Florida) |
- New Realm in Physical Attacks
- Speaker: Peter R Munguia (Intel Corporation)
- Abstract: Current landscape of IOT devices and form-factors offer a multidimensional attack surface opening up extensive opportunities for attacks like Root Kits, fault-injection and side-channel. Countermeasures becomes increasingly less effective against some of these novel attacks. This talk provides a brief overview of the security challenges in the existing threat models and on plethora of unexplored yet potential threats, for example on-chip attacks in the current SoCs. We will also examine how the threat landscape of the next-generation compute devices is changing with newer technologies like stack-die or innovations in 3D integrated circuits. The talk concludes by challenging the research community to fuel discovering untapped security paradigms.
- Simulation-Based Verification of EM Side-Channel Attack Resilience
- Speaker: Michael Orshansky (University of Texas at Austin)
- Abstract: Physical side-channel attacks present a formidable challenge to security of existing cryptographic applications. Electromagnetic (EM) attacks on embedded systems are especially problematic because of easy physical access and low cost of needed measurement equipment. While it is closely related to power analysis, EM channel leaks secrets under a wider set of conditions. This talk describes our on-going efforts to develop a computational analysis and verification platform for design-time prediction of electromagnetic side-channel attack vulnerability.
- Attacks on FPGA Bitstream: Piracy & Tampering in Field
- Speakers: Yousef Iskander (Cisco)
- Abstract: This talk will focus on physical proximity attacks on FPGA bitstreams. FPGA have security features, but not all are suitable for high-volume applications or general scenarios. A survey of technologies for protection and integrity will be given, as well as proposed solutions.
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